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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Prior to determining the Appellant, John F. Thomon's ("THORNTON's") issues on

appeal, it is necessary to establish whether or not the Defendant, Kari A. Clark ("CLARK") 1 had
standing to request declatory relief in the underlying case. CLARK did not own the dominant
estate associated with the appurtenant easement at issue in this appeal. Therefore, Respondent,
Mary E. Pandrea ("PANDREA") includes as an additional issue on appeal that CLARK lacked
standing to claim a right in the appertenant easement.
The Appellant's Brief challenges the district court's decision that CLARK provided
evidence to substantiate a right to use an easement appertenant to PANDREA' s portion of the
original Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 ("Parcel B") for a parcel other than Parcel
B.
THORNTON and PANDREA claim that they are the only owners of the original 5 acre
Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223. The easement at issue in this case benefits the
dominant 4.44 acres that PANDREA owns (from the original Warranty Deed, Instrument
Number 226223); while this easement burdens the servient .56 acre portion (of the original
Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223) owned by THORNTON. (R. Vol. I, p. 69-70; R.
Vol. I, p. 128-129; Aff. VT, Exhibit Nine; R. Vol. II, p. 390-391)
This easement was created in 1992, when approximately .56 acres was severed from the
original 5 acres described in the 1980 Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223. Id. This
1 As indicated by THORNTON's Appellant Brief, the Respondent, Kenneth J. and Deanna L. Barrett
("BARRETT' s") have replaced CLARK in this litigation.
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transaction was recorded in the Bonner County Recorder's Office as Quitclaim Deed, Instrument
Number 416381. Id.
The .56 acres conveyed from the original 5 acres in the 1980 Warranty Deed, Instrument
Number 226223 (as reflected in the 1992 conveyance) has been owned by THORNTON si_nce
1998. (Aff. JT, Exhibit One-J, R. Vol. II, p. 395-398) The easement reserved within the the .56
acres (the servient estate) was for the benefit of the remaining 4.44 acre portion of the original 5
acres (the dominant estate). (R. Vol. I, p. 69-70; R. Vol. I, p. 128-129; Aff. VT, Exhibit Nine; R.
Vol. II, p. 390-391)
The remaining 4.44 acres of the original 5 acres is now owned by P ANDREA. (R. Vol. I,
p. 139, ,r 3) Although the 4.44 acres had been co-owned by P ANDREA and CLARK, ownership
in this parcel transferred from CLARK to P ANDREA by way of a Judgment and Decree of

Partition in a separate litigation entered on January 24, 2014. Id.
As CLARK no longer owns the dominant 4.44 acre estate, CLARK lacked standing to
claim an "express" or appertenant easement (only reserved for the dominant 4.44 acre estate) to
benefit an entirely unrelated parcel.
This is the second appeal before this Court having to do with property rights in two

parcels of property recently partitioned in Bonner County, Idaho. The first appeal was argued on
December 11, 2015 before this Court in Boise, Idaho, by the Appellant on appeal in BON-CV2011-835, PANDREA, under Docket Number 42333-2014.
At issue in the preceding appeal was the prejudicial impact of a ten foot wide "road"
(created by the court) crossing from the southeasterly border of PANDREA's 12.739 acre
partition parcel to the northwesterly border.
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This "road" was inaccurately described within

CLARK's partition parcel as an "easement appertenant to the land for ingress and egress through
and over the parcel awarded to Plaintiff, Mary E. Pandrea as the servient parcel" when in fact,
the metes and bounds description of the "road" fails to reach any main road to allow for ingress
and egress. (R. Vol. I, p. 140,

,r

1-3) It should be noted that it is this "road" easement that is

currently reached by the "appurtenant easement" awarded to CLARK in the present underlying
case under appeai not to CLARK's parcel.
The portion of the previous appeal that is of relevance to this appeal is the preclusionary
affect of Idaho Code § 6-515i that should have legally bound and protected the parties from any
futher litigation regarding their property rights in the two parcels. This statute mandates that
"judgment must be rendered such that such partition be effectual forever, which judgment is
binding and conclusive [o ]n all persons named as parties to the action, ... or of any part thereof,

after the determination of a particular estate therein". Idaho Code§ 6-515
Based on the legally binding affects of Idaho Code§ 6-515, PANDREA includes as a
second additional issue on appeal, as purely a matter of law, the statutory implications of Idaho
Code§ 6-515 and whether or not this statute renders the judgment entered in this case unlawful.
P ANDREA ( as the owner of the dominant estate) was denied joinder with THORNTON
(as the owner of the servient estate) in the underlying case to defend against the counterclaim
filed by CLARK.

Nonetheless, PANDREA remains a party in this appeai2. PANDREA

respectfully submits her Responding Brief in support of the Appellant, John F. Thornton.

B.

2

Statement of Facts and Course of Procedings

PANDREA and THORNTON are in privity of estate in this matter.
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The factual and procedural histories of this case were previousley set forth in the
Appellant's Brief filed with this Court on November 18, 2015; therefore, they are summarized
herein.
Relevant Facts:
1.

Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 (Parcel B)

The 4.44 acres of the original Instrument No. 226223 has been referenced as Parcel 1,
Tax Lot 40, the Pandrea Parcel and herein as Parcel B. The .56 acre portion of the original
Instrument Number 226223 has been referenced as the Thornton Property and herein as Parcel
A. The relevant portion of the Chain of Title for Instrument Number 226223 (Parcel A and
Parcel B) is as follows:

1998
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The Supporting Documentation from the record on appeal for the Chain of Tile is as
follows:
February 13, 1980

PANDREA purchased an approximate 5 acre parcel of property on February 13, 1980
recorded as Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 ( R. Vol. II, p. 417,

,r 3.2; Aff.

VT,

Exhibit Three) Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 was subject to a 30 foot wide utility
easement "free from all encumbrances, except those presently of record (as of February 13,
1980) in the office of the records of Bonner County, Idaho". (Aff. VT, Exhibit Three) The
grantor did not reserve any rights in this parcel upon the sale of this parcel. (Id.) CLARK
became the co-tenant in this parcel on February 16, 1981. (R. Vol. II, p. 418, ,r 3.3)
December 1, 1992- Quitclaim Deed 416381
On December 1, 1992, PANDREA and CLARK conveyed .56 acres of Warranty Deed,

Instrument Number 226223 lying southeasterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek (to the property
now owned by THORNTON) by way of the first conveyance described in Quitclaim Deed
416381, referenced by Appellant as the "Shoreline Piece". (R. Vol. I, p. 69-70; R. Vol. I, p. 128-

129; Aff. VT, Exhibit Nine; R. Vol. II, p. 390-391)
The remaining 4.44 acre portion of the original Instrument Number 226223 (Parcel B)
lying Northwesterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek, reserved the use of the Southeasterly
segment of the utitily easement described in the original 1980 Instrument Number 226223. (Id.)
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January 24, 2014
On January 24, 2014, the entirty of CLARK's ownership in Instrument Number 226223

(Parcel B) transferred to P ANDREA by way of a Decree of Partition in a previous litigation
under BON-CV-2011-835. (R. Vol. I, p. 139,

1 3)

This transfer of ownership included any

"appurtenances thereon" which was described in the Record of Survey as:
The portion of the 30' wide access and utility easement through the Thornton
property may be appurtenant to the Pandrea parcel as it was originally contained
within Inst. # 226223. However, when Inst. #226223 extended to the County Road, the
property was SUBJECT TO the 30' easement. Subsequent deed, Instrument No. 525386,
reserved the same easement for the benefit of remainder of Instrument No. 226223,
after deeding a portion of that parcel in Instrument No. 525386.
(R. Vol. I. p. 143, Easement Note)

February 25, 2015
The Final Judgment was entered in BON-CV-2013-1334 whereby the district court
ordered, adjudged and decreed that "as set forth in Warranty Deed, Bonner County Instrument
Number 525386 and Quitclaim Deed, Bonner County Instrument Number 416381" that CLARK
has a "30.0 foot appurtenant easement for road right of way and utilities across" the
THORNTON .56 acre tract "being a portion of that easement previously described in

Instrument No. 226223" and "the right to use said easement for a right of way and utilities to
the following described ten and 423/IOOOs (10.423) acres of real property that were awarded to
KARI A. CLARK pursuant to the revised Judgment and Decree of Partition entered in Bonner
County Case No. CV-2011-835 ... being a portion of that parcel described in Instrument No.

396781". (Second Amended Final Judgment, Attachment 9, p. 2-3; to the Augmented Record on
Appeal)
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2.

Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 525386 (Parcel A)

In 1998, THORNTON purchased two tracts of land by way of Warranty Deed,
Instrument Number 525386 (Parcel A). A Notice Section was included on the deed to Parcel A
of an easement reserved in the second tract of land described in the deed. This specifically
referenced Instrument Number 416381, the names of the grantors on the deed (P ANDREA and
CLARK), and the date the deed was recorded, 1992. (Aff. IT, Exhibit One-J, R. Vol. II, p. 395398)

3.

Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 396781 (Parcel C)
October 17, 1991

Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 396781 (Parcel C) was purchased in 1991, and coowned byPANDREA and CLARK. (R. Vol. 418, 13.5)

Parcel C was described as "TOGETHER WITH and subject to a 30 foot easement for a
road right of way and utilities on existing road ... ". (Aff. VT, Exhibit Five)
The "Existing Road" easement (also referenced as the "upper road") runs from the county
road, crossing over and through Parcel C, and was recorded in 1975 under Instrument Number
170365 as a dedicated permanent Easement for "the owners of certain properties in Trust"; said
properties including Parcel C. (R. V. II, p. 364-366)
January 24, 2014

As a result of the partition action, on January 24, 2014, CLARK received 10.423 acres of
Instrument Number 396781 and "any appurtenances thereon".

(R. Vol. I, p. 140,

1

2)

PANDREA received the remaining 8.299 acres and "any appurtenances thereon". (R. Vol. I, p.
139, ft 2)
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MAP OF PARTITION SURVEY
(R. Vol. I, p. 143)
Instrument Number 226223 (PARCEL B)
Instrument Number 396781 (PARCEL C)

R. Vol. I, p. 143

CL4RK

I 0 . 423 ACRBS

B OUNDAR). NOT J:.'

RJVE.R !JtO()'NDARY
•

k

,, ~.

•••

••

*

•
.,

~

•

••

•• ~"'

#

•

.vo r,
•

BA SIS {.JI"' [JJ.'ARL~"'C.'.

... •,

~

•

., ,

UY;;EHJ}

EASEMENT NOTE
The portion of the 30' wide access and utility easement through the Thornton
property may be appurtenant to the Pandrea parcel as it was originally contained within
Inst.# 226223. However, when Inst. #226223 extended to the County Road, the property
was SUBJECT TO the 30' easement. Subsequent deed, Instrument No. 525386, reserved
the same easement/or the benefit of remainder of Instrument No. 226223, after
deeding a portion of that parcel in Instrument No. 525386.

RESPONSE BRIEF OF PANDREA-8

Relevant Procedural History:
On December 9, 2013, CLARK filed her answers, affirmative defenses and a
counterclaim in response to THORNTON's original complaint in BON-CV-2013-1334. (R. Vol.

I, pp.60-66)
On January 24, 2014, the case in BON-CV-2011-835 concluded and a Judgment and

Decree of Partition was entered. It was also "ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Decree of
Partition shall be effectual forever, and judgment is binding and conclusive: 1. On all persons
named as parties to the action ... " (Vol. 1, P. 141, 15). IC.§ 6-5153
As a result of the partition, CLARK did not receive any transfer of interest in the 30

foot utility easement originally described in Instrument Number 226223 lying Southeasterly
of the centerline of Tavern Creek and reserved in Instrument Number 416381. (Vol. I, p. 140141)

Just five days later, on January 29, 2014, CLARK motioned for partial summary
judgment on her declatory judgment claim in BON-CV-2013-1334 arguing that that she had an
"express easement" over the Thornton property by virtue of the language in Instrument Number
416381 (even though she was denied this request in BON-CV-2011-835). (R. Vol. II, p. 266,

1)
CLAR.K's motion was based on the allegations within her counterclaim that:

3

See endnote "i"
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ii

1.

Since the 1980's, MARYE. PANDREA (hereinafter "PANDREA''), and CLARK

have been joint owners of an approximate 20 acre parcel of property in Bonner County along
the Pack River. (R. Vol. I, p. 63, ,r 5)
2.

Since the 1940's, the road through the two acre parcel now owned by

THORNTON, which is subject to an easement in favor of CLARK as set forth in the 1992
Quitclaim Deed4 , has been continually used, and was the only road used, by CLARK and her
family to access the 20 acre parcel jointly owned by CLARK and P ANDREA. In addition, the
road through THORNTON'S 2 acre parcel is the only access to the 20 acre parcel jointly owned
by CLARK and PANDREA and said road is the only viable option for accessing CLARK'S
parcel. (R. Vol. I, p. 64, ,r 1)
3.

CLARK alleges that she has lawfully acquired the right to use and access the road

through THORNTON'S two acre parcel by way of an express easement appurtenant, as set forth
in the 1992 Quitclaim Deed, Instrument No. 416381. (R. Vol. I, P. 64, ,r 4)
On March 14, 2014, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
CLARK on her alleged claim of right to use the easement reserved in Instrument Number
416381. (R. Vol. II, p. 266, ,r 1)
The district court also granted CLARK's motion to strike the filings made by
PANDREA, including: her memorandum supporting THORNTON's response to the partial
summary judgment; affidavits in support of her memorandum; and the response to CLAR.K's
motion to strike. (R. Vol. II, p. 287, ,r 4, ,r 5)

4

Referencing Instrument Number 416381 (R. Vol. I, p. 63, ,r,[ 6, 7, 8)

RESPONSE BRIEF OF PANDREA-IO

The district court relied on the representations and the affidavit of CLARK's counsel;
Joel P. Hazel, to support its memorandum decision, order and subsequent Judgment on this
motion. (R. Vol. II, p. 272, ,r 2, Ll. 2-6)
The district court also relied on the affidavit of CLARK's niece; TERRI BOYD-DAVIS
(who is DEANNA BARRETT's sister and the legal assistant to the BARRETT's attorney of
record, MICHAEL G. SCHMIDT), to support its memorandum decision, order and subsequent
Judgment on this motion. (R. Vol. II, p. 272, Ll. 7-9)
Judgment was entered on April 30, 2014. (R. Vol. II., p. 528, ,r 1, LL 11-12)
THORNTON and PANDREA5 both attempted to correct the factual and legal errors
made by the district court by filing reconsideration motions, which were both denied on June 2,
2014. (R. Vol. II, p. 552-553)
A Final Amended Judgment was ordered by this Court and entered as such on February
25, 2015 (Respondent's Augmented Motion, Attachment 9).
II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

In addition to the Issues presented on Appeal by THORNTON, as issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, PANDREA presents the following additional issues:

12.

CLARK did not own the dominant estate to the THORNTON servient estate
and did not have standing to request a declatory judgment granting the relief
CLARK received.

5

Thornton filed his motion on May 6, 2014, and Pandrea filed her motion on April 23, 2014. Pandrea
and Thornton stipulated to dismiss the claims by Thornton against Pandrea, which was signed on May 20,
2014.
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13.

m.

The district court unlawfully issued an additional judgment pertaining to the
rights in the two parcels of property previously partitioned, which
subsequent judgment was precluded by the legally binding and conclusive
effect of the resulting Judgment and Decree of Partition entered in the prior
litigation.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

New Issue-Standing

This Court first addresses questions of standing to determine whether or not it is
necessary to reach the remaining issues on appeal.

Also, because the issue of standing is

jurisdictional, Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129,
1132 (2000), it may be raised at any time, Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d
355, 357 (1982).
Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake,_143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456 (2006).
B.

New Issue-Application of Idaho Code§ 6-515 is Purely a Question of Law
Where issues on appeal involve questions oflaw, a reviewing court exercises free review.

Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish and Son, 120 Idaho 185, 814 P. 2d 917 (1991). An issue
involving a statutory construction and interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de
novo. State Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Haousel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 102, 90 P. 3d 321, 325,
327 (2004).
A synopsis of the acceptable standard of review used by this Court in considering pure
questions of law raised initially on appeal can be found in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Bistline in Ochoa v. STATE, INDUS. SPEC. INDEM. FUND, 794 P. 2d 1127 at 1133, 1134ldaho Supreme Court 1990:
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This court may consider a pure question of law even if not raised below where refusal to
reach the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice or where the issue's resolution is
of public importance. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360-61
(11th Cir.1984).
This is echoed by the position of the Ninth Circuit Court that "[g]enerally, this court
should not consider arguments that the appellant failed to raise below. Rothman v. Hospital

Service of Southern California, 510 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir.1975). Application of the rule is
discretionary. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826
(1976).

However, this court may dispense with the waiver rule when "the question is a purely
legal one that is both central to the case and important to the public." In Re Sells, 719 F.2d 985,
990 (9th Cir.1983). "It is well settled in this circuit that where the new issue is purely a legal one,
the injection of which would not have caused the parties to develop new or different facts, we
may resolve it on appeal, "United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919, 925 n. 5 (9th Cir.1983), "the
rationale is that a legal question does not depend on the factual record below, or that the pertinent
record is fully developed and easily applied to the legal theory". United States v. Patrin, 573
F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1978).

C.

Summary Judgment

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same
standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Summary judgment
is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
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entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." IR. C.P. 56(c). When considering whether the
evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must
liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.
Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC, 158 Idaho 73, 75-76, 343 P.3d 1080, 1082-83 (2015) (quoting
Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23,333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014)).

D.

Motion to Reconsider

When a district court decides a motion to reconsider, "the district court must apply the
same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered." Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (2014); Fragnella
v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). If the original order was within the

trial court's discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the motion to reconsider. Id.
When this Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for
reconsideration, they use the same standard of review the lower court used in deciding the
motion for reconsideration. Id.
IV.

ARGUMENT
A.

STANDING
ISSUE ON APPEAL #12

1.

CLARK did not own the dominant estate to the THORNTON servient estate
and did not have standing to request a declatory judgment granting the relief
CLARK received.

A prerequisite to a declaratory judgment action is an actual or justiciable controversy.
Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 681 P.2d 988 (1984). In this case, CLARK sought

declatory judgment on one particular legal theory in a motion for partial summary judgment. To
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establish that CLARK had an actual or justiciable claim, she must frrst meet the standing
requirements for the claim being made.

Generally, justiciability questions are divisible into

several sub-categories: advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, ripeness,
mootness, political questions and administrative questions. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho
635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989).
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides authority for the courts to render declaratory
judgments. State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 69, 822 P.2d 960, 966 (1991). However, the
Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the
action in the frrst instance. Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc., Inc. v. State ex rel. Batt, 128 Idaho 831,
834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996).
Although not all easements must serve the dominant estate holder, such as easements en
gross 6 (which do not attach to property) or public easements7 (Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho

767, 774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 {2006)); an express or appurtenant easement serves only the
dominant estate holder as [a]n easement appurtenant "is one whose benefits serve a parcel of
land. More exactly, it serves the owner of that land in a way that cannot be separated from his
rights in the land." Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 550, 808 P.2d 1289,
1295 (1991) (quotation omitted)

6

Citing: Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003); King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 909, 42 P.3d
698, 702(2002)and
7 Bente/ v. Bannock County, 104 Idaho 130, 133, 656 P.2d 1383, 1386 (1983) (discussing a public prescriptive
easement).
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CLARK claimed that an express easement existed crossing the THORNTON property to
reach CLARK'S dominant parcel. (R. Vol. I, P. 64, 14)
As this Court has repeatedly concluded "[t]o have standing to enforce the dominant
estate's rights over the servient estate, CLARK must demonstrate that she is the owner of the
dominant estate. Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456,459 (2006);
citing Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n, 142 Idaho at 604, 130 P.3d at 1142; see Christensen v.

City of Pocatello, 142 Idaho at 136, 124 P.3d at 1012.
In this case, it is imperative to first define ''what" the dominant estate was before
establishing "who" owned it. In this regard, the district court failed to properly delineate the
correct dominant tenement.
a.

The dominant parcel was the remaining portion of the original Warranty
Deed, Instrument Number 226223 after severance of a portion of this "Tract
of Land".

There was no ambiguity in the conveying deed from 1992, Quitclaim Deed, Instrument
Number 416381. "The existence of ambiguity determines the standard of review of a lower
court's interpretation of a contract or instrument." Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass 'n. Inc.

v. Cool, 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P. 3d 484,486 (2004) Citing: Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ethington
Fam. Trust, 137 Idaho 435, 437-38, 50 P. 3d 450, 452-53 (2002) "The legal effect of an
unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a question oflaw." Id.,
Citing: Latham v. Garner, 105 ldaho 854,857,673 P. 2d 1048, 1051 (1983).
The deed of conveyance in 1992 (Instrument Number 4163 81) unambiguously contains
the identity of the parties, a description of the property being conveyed, the words of conveyance
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and the intention to burden the property with an easement. Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212,
218,280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012)
The property being conveyed in Instrument Number 416381 was a metes and bounds
description of:

"That portion of the following described Tract lying Southeasterly of the Centerline of
Tavern Creek:
A tract ofland located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian,
Bonner County, Idaho, more fully described as follows:
Commencing at the Southeast comer of said Section 11 ... to the point of beginning"
Subject to and reserving a 30.0 foot easement (also located southeasterly of the
centerline ofTavem Creek) for a road right of way and utilities, more fully described as
follows:

A tract ofland for a road easement located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2
West, Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho, said road easement being 30.0 feet wide
(15.0 feet from each side of the centerline) the centerline being more fully described as
follows:
Commencing at the Southeast comer of said Section 11 ... East a distance of 300.00 feet
more or less to the Westerly right-of-way of the Pack River County Road".
(R. Vol. I, p. 69-70; R. VoJ. I, p. 128-129; Aff. VT, Exhibit Nine; R. Vol. II, p. 390-391)
The "Tract of Land" referenced in the first conveyance described in Instrument Number
416381 was the original "Tract of Land" described identically in Warranty Deed, Instrument
Number 226223 as:
"A tract ofland located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2 West, Boise
Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho, more fully described as follows:
Commencing at the Southeast corner of said Section 11 ... to the point ofbeginning"
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Subject to a 30.0 foot easement for a road right of way and utilities, more fully described
as follows:
A tract of land for a road easement located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2
West, Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho, said road easement being 30.0 feet wide
(15.0 feet from each side of the centerline) the centerline being more fully described as
foilows:
Commencing at the Southeast corner of said Section I I ... East a distance of300.00 feet
more or less to the Westerly right-of-way of the Pack River County Road".
(Aff. VT, Exhibit Three, ,r 2)
Based on the unambiguous deed of conveyance (#416381 ), and the unambiguous original
deed of record described as the conveying "Tract of Land" (#226223), it is clear that the
dominant tenement in this conveyance is the remaining portion of the original Warranty Deed,
Instrument 226223 lying Northwesterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek.

b.

The Chain of Title for Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223,
conclusively shows that CLARK does not own the dominant estate to the
THORNTON servient estate.

Idaho law next looks to the ownership of the dominant estate to establish ''who" has
standing in an action such as this.

Tungsten, supra.

The Chain of Title for Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223, wherein the dominant
estate lies, was not properly established by the district court. From the point of severance in
1992 of the .56 acres from Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223, until January 24, 2014,
the original "grantors" named in Instrument Number 416381 co-owned the remaining 4.44 acre
portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223. The "grantors" named on the 1992
conveying deed (Instrument 416381) were PANDREA and CLARK.
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Transfer of ownership in the dominant 4.44 acre portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument
Number 226223 occurred on January 24, 2014, with PANDREA named as the owner. (R. Vol. I,
p. 140-142) As easements pass with property, the easement reserved in Quitclaim Deed,
Instrument Number 416381for the dominant 4.44 acre portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument
Number 226223, also transferred to PANDREA. Idaho Code § 55-603ii.
CLARK no longer owned the dominant estate as of January 24, 2014 and no longer had
standing to make her claim.
Judge Mitchell cites to the proposition in Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho, 225, 76 P. 3d 969
(2003), that "anyone whom either PANDREA or CLARK transfer their property to in the future,
will receive the benefit of the easement across THORNTON's land" (R. Vol. II, p. 540, ,r 2, L.
17-19); yet, he failed to apply this legal standard to CLARK's transfer of ownership in the
dominant estate (#226223) to PANDREA by way of the Judgment and Decree ofPartition.
The Judgment and Decree of Partition was the final legally binding document in the
Chain of Title for Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 showing ownership in the
dominant 4.44 acre portion of this deed being conveyed to PANDREA. It states that:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
The following twelve and 739/lOOOs (12.739) acres of real property and any
appurtenances thereon are hereby awarded to Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Mary E.
Pandrea:
A tract of land situated in the Southeast Quarter (SE Y4) of Section Eleven, Township
Fifty-nine (59) North, Range Two (2) West of the Boise Meridian, Bonner County,
Idaho, being a portion of that parcel described in Instrument No. 396781 and a portion of

that parcel described in Instrument number 226223;". (R. Vol. I, p. 139, ,r 3)
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While CLARK received "10.423 acres of Instrument Number 396781 and "any
appurtenances thereon" and no portion of Instrument Number 226223 as a result of the
Judgment and Decree of Partition. (R. Vol. I, p. 140, ,r 2)
The "Tract ofLand'' within the original 1991 Warranty Deed, Instrument Number
396781 was described as:
A tract ofland located in Section 11, Township 59 North, Range 2 West of the Boise
Meridian, Bonner County , Idaho, more fully described as follows:
Commencing at the South Quarter Corner of said Section 11. .. West a distance of
330.00 feet more or less to the point of beginning.
(Aff. ofVT, Exhibit Five, ,r 1)
At no time in the underlying case did the district court determine that CLARK owned any
portion of Instrument Number 226223.

The district court only determined that Instrument

Number 226223 was land conveyed to PANDREA. (R. Vol. II, ,r 1, L. 4-5)
HOWEVER, in the final judgment issued in this case, the district court ordered that
CLARK had a right to use "a portion of that easement previously described in Instrument

Number 226223" to reach "a portion of Instrument Number 396781", described more
particularly in the Judgment as:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDED AND DECREED that as set forth in Warranty
Deed, Bonner County Instrument No. 525386 (the THORNTON DEED) and Quitclaim
Deed, Bonner County Instrument Number 416381, KARI A. CLARK and KARI A.
CLAR.K's heirs, successors and assigns have a 30.0 foot appurtenant easement for road
right of way and utilities across the following described Tract lying Southeasterly of
the Centerline of Tavern Creek:
Commencing at the Southeast comer of said Section 11 ...
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the appurtenant
easement across the above described tract of land is situated in the Southeast Quarter (SE
V4) of Section Eleven (11), Township Fifty-nine (59) North, Range Two (2) West of the
Boise Meridian, Bonner County, Idaho being a portion of that easement previously
described in Instrument No. 226223, which is Thirty (30) feet in width and lying
Fifteen (15) feet on each side of the following described centerline:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above described
appurtenant easement grants KARI A. CLARK and KARI A. CLARK's heir, successors
and assigns the right to use said easement for right of way and utilities to the
following described ten and 423/lOOO's (10.423) acres of real property that were
awarded to KARI A. CLARK pursuant to the Revised Judgment and Decree of
Partition entered in Bonner County Case No. CV-2011-835:
A tract ofland situated in the Southeast Quarter (SEl/4) of Section Eleven,
Township Fifty-nine (59) North, Range Two (2) West of the Boise Meridian,
Bonner County, Idaho, being a portion of that parcel described in Instrument
No. 396781;''

(Second Amended Final Judgment, Attachment 9, p. 2-3; to the Augmented Record on Appeal)
c.

Summary of Argument.

The district court failed to properly identify the conveying "Tract of Land" in Quitclaim
Deed, Instrument Number 416381(1 st conveyance) 8 to be the original Warranty Deed, Instrument
Number 226223; failed to recognize that CLARK no longer owned the dominant 4.44 acre
portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223; and failed to conclude as a result that
CLARK did not have standing.
The current Ownership in the original Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 is
held in part by P ANDREA and in part by THORNTON. Of the original 5 acres, THORNTON

8 Instrument Number 39678 l briefly conveyed property to the THORNTON'S predecessor in 1992, described as the
second conveyance in Quitclaim Deed, Instrument Number 416381; however that conveyance was unwound a short
time later and prior to the recordation of the THORNTON Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 525386.
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owns the servient .56 acres as described in his 1998 Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 525386
(Aff. IT, Exhibit One-J, R. Vol. II, p. 395-398); and PANDREA owns the remaining original

dominant 4.44 acre portion, as described in the 2014 Judgment and Decree ofPartition. (R. Vol.
I, p. 139, ~ 3)
Because CLARK did not have ownership of the dominant estate, she did not have
standing to request declatory relief, as there was no actual or justiciable controversy at issue. As
standing cannot be established by CLARK, the remaining issues on appeal regarding the
easement appurtenant to PANDREA's property need not be reached.

However, should this

Court conclude otherwise, PANDREA's remaining arguments will address these issues.

B.

Application of Idaho Code § 6-515 is Purely a Question of Law
ISSUE ON APPEAL #13
2.

The district court unlawfully issued an additional judgment pertaining to the
rights in the two parcels of property previously partitioned, which
subsequent judgment was precluded by the legally binding and conclusive
effect of the resulting Judgment and Decree of Partition entered in the prior
litigation.

The preclusive effect of the Judgment and Decree of Partition was evidence on record
before the district court (in this instant case) of the legally binding and conclusive disposition of
the two parcels and their respectively awarded easement rights.

a.

Idaho Code § 6-515

As is required under Idaho Code 6-515 partitioning statute:
Upon the report being confirmed, judgment must be rendered that such partition be effectual
forever, which judgment is binding and conclusive:
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1. On all persons named as parties to the action, and their legal representatives, who
have at the time any interest in the property divided, or any part thereof, as owners in fee or
as tenants for life or for years, or as entitled to the reversion, remainder, or the inheritance of
such property, or of any part thereof, after the determination of a particular estate therein, and
who by any contingency may be entitled to a beneficial interest in the property, or who have an
interest in any undivided share thereof, as tenants for years or for life.
Legislative defmitions of terms included within a statute control and dictate the meaning
of those terms as used in the statute. Roe v. Hopper, 90 Idaho 22,408 P.2d 161 (1965). CLARK
was clearly a '1)erson named as a party to the action" within the legally binding and conclusive
body of language both within the Judgment and Decree of Partition document (R. Vol. I, p. 141,
~

5) and under Idaho Code § 6-515. Just as clearly, "forever'', "binding" and "conclusive" are

contractual words that legally bind the parties to the terms of the partition. Lastly, the words

"any interest in the property divided, or any part thereof" would include easement interests.
Idaho Code§ 6-515
The determination of whether or not the statute is applicable is a matter of law (reviewed

de novo). Floyd v. Board of Comm'rs of Bonneville County,_131 Idaho 234, 953 P.2d 568
( 1998). Interpretation of an instrument, such as the Judgment and Decree of Partition, is also a
question oflaw. Chaves v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P. 3d 1036 (2008).
A statute must be construed as a whole, taking the literal words of the statute, which
words must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137
Idaho, 473, 50 P. 3d 488 (2002); State v. Hart, 134 Idaho 827, 25 P. 3d 850 (2001). If a statute is
not ambiguous, the Court does not construe it, but simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen

v. State Farm 1\1.ut. Auto Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P. 2d 974 (1987). Unless the result is
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palpably absurd, or legislative intent is clearly to the contrary, a Court must assume that the
legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P. 2d
968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P. 3d 445 (2003).

b.

The Standards of Review are Applicable

1.

According to the standards set forth in the Standards of Review section of this

brief, in order for a pure question of law to be considered by this Court, there should not be any
further additional facts that would need to be developed in this case. See, Ochoa, supra. This
standard has been met, as a copy of the Judgment and Decree of Partition was used as evidence
in the underlying case and is in the record on appeal at R. Vol. I, p. l 38-143.
This leaves only a pure matter of law before this Court in determining the application of
the ordinary meaning of Idaho Code 6-515. PANDREA argues that the subsequent judgment
was unlawful, and that the application of the plain and ordinary language within Idaho Code§ 6-

515 would support this argument.
2.

The second standard is whether or not a miscarriage of justice resulted when the

legally binding and conclusive terms of the Judgment and Decree of Partition, as set forth in

Idaho Code § 6-515, were violated when additional litigation resulted in a "change" to the
preceding terms of the Partition and Decree of Partition. See, Ochoa, supra.
This "miscarriage of justice" occurred when the Judgment in this underlying case did in
fact alter the "interest in the property divided, or any part thereof" by granting CLARK a
new right in the property divided.
When the legally binding and conclusive Judgment and Decree of Partition was issued
on January 24, 2014, PANDREA was the only "person named as a party to the action" who
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retained the legally described easement appurtenant to the 4.44 acre portion of Warranty Deed,
Instrument Number 226223. (R. Vol. I, p. 139,

1 2-1

3) This changed when CLARK was

granted the same easement in the subsequent Judgment, finalized on February 25, 2015. (Second

Amended Final Judgment, Attachment 9, p. 2-3; to the Augmented Record on Appeal)

c.

Summary of Argument

It was plainly written in the partition deed that:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
The following twelve and 739/lOOOs (12.739) acres of real property and any

appurtenances thereon are hereby awarded to Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Mary E.
Pandrea:
A tract of land situated in the Southeast Quarter (SE V,i) of Section Eleven, Township
Fifty-nine (59) North, Range Two (2) West of the Boise Meridian, Bonner County,
Idaho, being a portion of that parcel described in Instrument No. 396781 and a portion of

that parcel described in Instrument number 226223;".
(R. Vol. I, p. 139, 13)
The required language of Idaho Code 6-515 was also included in the Judgment and

Decree of Partition. (Id. at p. 141,il 5, 16, 17 and p. 142, 11)
In contravention to Idaho Code § 6-515, the district court not only allowed CLARK'S
claim to proceed, but then issued an unlawful judgment granting CLARK an additional interest
in the properties so divided, namely allowing CLARK to use the easement appurtenant to
PANDREA's individually owned partitioned parcel.
substantially

affecting

both

THORNTON
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and

This was a miscarriage of justice

PANDREA's

property

rights;

while

simultaneously denying PANDREA's due process rights to defend against the unlawful claim
and resulting unlawful judgment.

APPELLANT ISSUES ON APPEAL
THORNTON assigns ELEVEN ( 11) issues presented on appeal. P ANDREA responds as
follows as to ISSUE #1 AND ISSUE #2:

APPELLANT'S ISSUE #1: Was it an abuse of discretion for the district court to
determine factual issues on summary judgment where the matter was set for jury
trial?
APPELLANT'S ISSUE #2: Was it error to interpret the Warranty Deed as giving
notice of an Easement in favor of Clark, as a matter of law, whether or not she still
owned the dominant estate?
PANDREA'S RESPONSE TO ISSUE #1 and ISSUE #2:
C.

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THORNTON correctly assigns error to the district court's abuse of discretion m
determining partial summary judgment.
This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings under an abuse of
discretion standard. See-Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50-51, 995 P.2d
816, 820-21 (2000). To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court
considers whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. Error is disregarded as harmless

unless the ruling affects a substantial right of the party. Id.; I.RE. 103(a); I.R.C.P. 61.
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The district court had the discretion to determine whether or not the evidence on record
for partial summary judgment was substantial and relevant evidence to conclusively fulfill the
required legal standards used to determine if summary judgment is appropriate.

Namely,

whether or not the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine issue
of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable
inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party. Golub v. Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC, 158 Idaho 73, 7576, 343 P.3d 1080, 1082-83 (2015) (quoting Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 23,333 P.3d 130,
134 (2014)).
a.

The district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard, as

there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the accuracy of CLARK's allegations of the
existence of "one 20 Acre Parcel".

The only evidence to support CLARK's allegation that she and PANDREA had
partitioned "one 20 Acre Parcel" was the allegation itself (R. Vol. I, p. 63,, 5) There is no deed
ofrecord (or chain ohitle) on record to substantiate this claim.
The evidence on record contradicted CLARK's claim of "one 20 Acre Parcel" as the
Judgment and Decree of Partition described a partition which included two separate Instrument

Numbers: Instrument Number 226223 and Instrument Number 396781. (R. Vol. I, p. 138-143)
The evidence on record contradicted CLARK's claim of "one 20 Acre Parcel" as the
Judgment and Decree of Partition described a combined acreage of 23 .162 acres. (Id.)

RESPONSE BRIEF OF PANDREA-27

Therefore, there was a genuine issue of material fact, as CLARK's conflict between the
allegation and the evidence on record were unresolved when partial summary judgment was
made. The district court relied on CLARK's allegation to conclude that since the easement
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Acre Parcel" that the easement now would appertain to each of the resulting parcels for CLARK
and P ANDREA at the conclusion of the Judgment and Decree of Partition.
This was an abuse of discretion, as the required standard for partial summary judgment
should have been to deny CLARK, as the moving party, as there was an unresolved genuine
issue of material fact at large.

b.

The district court abused its discretion in determining partial summary judgment

in favor or CLARK, without evidence that CLARK's property was descn"bed within the conveying
parcel when the easement was created.
At the time that partial summary judgment was decided, CLARK had not provided any
evidence that the 10.423 acres she received in the partition made up any portion of the "Tract of
Land" described within the conveying property (shown as the first conveyance) within Quitclaim
Deed, Instrument Number 416381.
This could only have been established by the district court's review of the chain of title
for Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 396781, as the Judgment and Decree of Partition on
record before the district court clearly showed that CLARK had been awarded "a portion of that
parcel described in Instrument Number 396781" (R. Vol. 1, p. 140, if3).
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On January 24, 2014, in addition to PANDREA being awarded all of the remaining 4.44
acre portion of Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 (with THORNTON still owning the
.56 acre portion); a second parcel was divided between CLARK and PANDREA.
This was an 18.72 acre parcel originally recorded as Warranty Deed, Instrument Number
396781.

PANDREA received 8.29 acres of this second parcel (which was added to

PANDREA's awarded 4.44 acres in the first parcel #226223 by way of a lot line adjustment
between the two ajoining parcels); and CLARK received 10.423 acres of this second parcel. (R.
Vol. I, p. 139, ,r 3 and 140, ,r 3)
The district court did not have any evidence prior to deciding the partial summary
judgment that the conveying "Tract of Land" as described in Quitclaim Deed, Instrument
Number 416381 (the first conveyance) was related in any way to any portion of Warranty Deed,
Instrument Number 396781.
The only documents relied on by the district court to determine partial summary
judgment were Instrument Number 416381, the THORNTON Warranty Deed, Instrument
Number 525386, and a copy of the Judgment and Decree of Partition from BON-CV-2011-835
that were all attached to the affidavit of CLARK's attorney, Joel P. Hazel. The remaining
conclusions were drawn from CLARK's allegations and the affidavit of her niece Terri BoydDavis. (R. Vol. II, p. 272, ,r 2)
The problem is that no evidence existed to substantiate that any part of the property
owned by CLARK was actually included in the conveying parcel described within the first
conveyance in Instrument Number 416381. The THORNTON's Warranty Deed, Instrument
Number 525386 put THORNTON on notice in 1998 that an easement burdened his property as a
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result of Instrument Number 416381. Additionally, CLARK and PANDREA were named as the
owners in 1998 of the "Tract of Land" as described in the first property conveyance shown on
Instrument Number 416381.

But, nowhere in the evidence used to determine the partial

summary judgment was there a deed depicting what "Tract of Land" the conveyance was made
from, or whether or not CLARK and P ANDREA still owned the conveying "Tract of Land".
Instead, the district court simply concluded that the language in the THORNTON
Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 525385 "establish[es] an easement" that "grants a thirtyfoot easement for a road right of way and utilities to Mary E. Pandrea and Kari A Clark for a
right of way and utilities which serves their land ... " (R. Vol. II, p.279, ,r 5, L. 2 and p. 280, ,r 2,
L. 10-11)
Because the chain of title for the two parcels making up ''their land" were not taken into
consideration (as they were not included as evidence), there were genuine issues of material facts
not on record, and it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to grant partial summary
judgment.

c.

It was an abuse of discretition for the district court to determine partial summary

judgment without resolving the conflicting evidence submitted by CLARK.
Included within CLARK's evidence to support her motion for partial summary judgment
was the following description of the disposition of the easement crossing the THORNTON
property at the conclusion of the Judgment and Decree of Partition in the Record of Survey:
The portion of the 30' wide access and utility easement through the Thornton

property may be appurtenant to the Pandrea parcel as it was originally contained
within Inst.# 226223. However, when Inst. #226223 extended to the County Road, the
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property was SUBJECT TO the 30' easement.

Subsequent deed, Instrument No.

525386, reserved the same easement for the benefit of remainder of Instrument No.
226223, after deeding a portion of that parcel in Instrument No. 525386.

(R. Vol. I. p. 143, Easement Note)

To ciarify, it was actuaiiy Quitciaim Deed, Instrument Number 4i638i that reserved the
easement, while Instrument Number 525386 included a notice section of the easement reserved
within Instrument Number 416381. Regardless, this conflicted with CLARK's allegation that
she had a right to use the same easement to benefit Instrument Number 396781. (Respondent's
Augmented Motion, Attachment 9, p. 3, ,r 3, L.3-4)
Partial summary judgment was not proper with conflicting evidence being unresolved,
especially in light of the fact that it was provided by CLARK.
d.

The district court issued an inconsistent judgment by combining

legal

standards for easements en gross and appurtenant easements.

The partial summary judgment resulted in a Final Judgment on February 25, 2015,
whereby CLARK was said to have a right to use a 30.0 foot easement for road right of way and
utilities crossing the THORNTON property, "being a portion of that easement previously
described in Instrument Number 226223. ." and that the appurtenant easement "assigns the right
to use said easement for right of way and utilities to the 10.423 acres ... " "being a portion of that
parcel described in 396781 ". (Respondent's Augmented Motion, Attachment 9, p. 2-3).
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The primary distinction between an easement in gross and an easement appurtenant is
that in the latter there is, and in the former there is not, a dominant estate to which the

easement is attached. West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 511 P.2d 1326 (1973). An easement in gross
is merely a personal interest in the land of another, (Id.); whereas an easement appurtenant is an
interest which is annexed to the possession of the dominant tenement and passes with it.

Nelson v. Johnson, I 06 Idaho 385, 387, 679 P.2d 662,664, 665 (1984) Citing: 3, Powell on Real
Property§ 418, at 34-216 (1981). An appurtenant easement must bear some relation to the use of
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the dominant estate and is incapable of existence separate from it; any attempted severance
from the dominant estate must fail. West at 34-217.
The appurtenant easement awarded to CLARK does not reach, or attach to the portion of
Instrument Nu___mber 396781 that she was awarded i.11 the Judgment and Decree of Partition. It

reaches and attaches to PANDREA's parcel.
Currently, the Barrett's use the easement granted to them in this underlying case not to
reach the parcel that transferred to CLARK in the preceding Judgment and Decree of Partition;
but to reach the 10 foot eighteen course "road" easement created in the Judgment and Degree
ofPartition. Depending on the outcome of the pending previous appeal, should the 10 foot
eighteen course "road" easement be found to prejudice P ANDREA and be reversed, the Barrett's
will not be able to reach their parcel using the "appurtenant easement" granted to CLARK in this
case.
Because the easement described for CLARK in the Final Judgment does not "attach or
reach" the parcel described in the Final Judgment, it would meet the defmition of an easement en

gross, not appurtenant. This conflicts with the language contained within the Final Judgment
which references the easement as "appurtenant". It also means that the wrong legal standards
were applied, as CLARK was granted an appurtenant easement, yet it does not meet the
requirements necessary to consider it as such.

D.

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

THORNTON correctly assigns error to the district court's denial of the Reconsideration
Motion filed at

conclusion of the partial
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judgment.

When a district court decides a motion to reconsider, "the district court must apply the
same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). The
standard of review in this case would rely on the same standards used to determine partial
summary judgment in favor of CLARK. As the moving party, THORNTON was entitled to
judgment in his favor upon the reconsideration of new information absent any genuine issues of
material fact.
As a result of the Reconsideration Motion, THORNTON succeeded in establishing for
the district court the chain of title for the two parcels that were partitioned between CLARK and
PANDREA in BON-CV-2011-835. The significance of this new information was that the
original deed of record for Instrument Number 226223 conclusively supported that the "Tract of
Land" described within the first conveyance in Quitclaim Deed, Instrument 416381 was one in
the same with the "Tract of Land" described within Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223.
Without a doubt, the identity of the conveying "Tract of Land" wherein the easement had
originated had been established by the submission of Warranty Deed, Instrument Number
226223. The district court was then in possession of the deeds ofrecord for both the dominant
estate (226223) and the servient estate (525386) described within Quitclaim Deed, Instrument
Number 4163 81. The Judgment and Decree of Partition on record also provided conclusive
evidence that PANDREA was the owner of the dominant estate (226223).
In light of this information, the district court correctly concluded that the dominant estate
was created in 1992; that "at that moment" PANDREA and CLARK owned the dominant estate
as tenants in common until January 24, 2014 (R. Vol. II, p. 540, ,-r 2, L. 8-12); then incorrectly
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reiterates the previous concurrence with CLARK that "one 20 Acre Parcel" had been divided in
the partition, stating that this was "uncontroverted" evidence (R. Vol. II, p. 536, ,r 1) and that
"[a]ll Judge Luster did on January 24, 2014, in a different lawsuit, was to partition that property
between Pandrea and Clark, but Pandrea and Clark still own the dominant estate. (R. Vol. II,
p. 540, ,r 2, L. 8-12)
Based on the "unambiguous" deeds of record in this case, it is unclear how the district
court arrived at these conclusions. A review of the record on appeal will show that THORNTON
owns the servient estate (lying southeasterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek) and that
PANDREA owns the dominant estate (lying northwesterly of the centerline of Tavern Creek) as
described within both Warranty Deed, Instrument Number 226223 and within Instrument
Number 416381. As such, partial summary judgment should have been issued in favor of
THORNTON as a result of the Reconsideration Motion.
V.

CONCLUSION

CLARK did not have standing to pursue this claim and the Judgment in this case should
be reversed in favor of THORNTON. Furthermore, the district court should not have unlawfully
issued a subsequent Judgment in violation ofldaho Code§ 6-515, which would nullify the
validity of the Judgment in this case. In the alternative, the judgment should be reversed in favor
of THORNTON on his reconsideration motion based on the unambiguous deeds ofrecord in this
case for the three parcels of property at issue.

RESPONSE BRIEF OF P ANDREA-35

i 6-515. REPORT OF REFEREES -- CONFIRMATION -- JUDGMENT. The court may
confirm, change, modify or set aside the report, and if necessary appoint new referees. Upon the
report being confrrmed, judgment must be rendered that such partition be effectual forever,
which judgment is binding and conclusive:
I. On all persons named as parties to the action, and their legal representatives, who have
at the time any interest in the property divided, or any part thereof, as owners in fee or as tenants
for life or for years, or as entitled to the reversion, remainder, or the inheritance of such property,
or of any part thereof, after the determination of a particular estate therein, and who by any
contingency may be entitled to a beneficial interest in the property, or who have an interest in
any undivided share thereof, as tenants for years or for life.
2. On all persons interested in the property, who may be unknown, to whom notice has
been given of the action for partition by publication.
3. On all other persons claiming from such parties or persons or either of them. And no
judgment is invalidated by reason of the death of any party before final judgment or decree; but
such judgment or decree is as conclusive against the heirs, legal representatives or assigns of
such decedent as if it had been entered before his death.
ii Idaho Code§ 55-603 EASEMENTS PASS WITH PROPERTY. A transfer of real property
passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in favor thereof an easement to use other real
property of the person whose estate is transferred, in the same manner and to the same extent as
such property was obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is transferred, for
the benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed.
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